In the aftermath of a violent civil war, in which about 100,000 people were killed, about 2 million of a total population of 4.4 million displaced, and the majority of structures destroyed or damaged, the international community has engaged in a major effort to rebuild the physical infrastructure and psychological-social trust of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) (Belloni, 2001; Dani et al, 1999; Fagan, 2005; Phuong, (Bozic, 2006; Eastmond, 2006; Fagan, 2005; Simonsen, 2005) . A recent editorial piece by Paddy Ashdown (former head of the OHR) and Richard Holbrooke (the chief negotiator of the Dayton accords) warns of "another powder-keg) (Ashdown and Holbrooke, 2008) .
In order to evaluate the potential for reducing the boundaries and social distances between the peoples of BiH (Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks), it is important to have a clear sense of the level of inter-ethnic friendship and the attitudes that BiH citizens have about broadening and deepening them. In examining relations in Northern Ireland after three decades of conflict ended, researchers have found that in-group identity , trust of the other group, and inter-group contact are key elements of inter-group forgiveness and reconciliation. (Hewstone et al. 2006; Noor et al. 2008) . Research on trust in political science has indicated both the difficulty of rebuilding trust in the aftermath of conflict and the importance of personal contacts in reducing suspicion and hostility between groups (Varshney, 2001; Widner, 2004; Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005) .
Since the Dayton Accords were agreed, BiH has been the subject of intense research on the nature and trend in inter-ethnic relations by both academic researchers and the international community representatives that, in effect, are running the country. Typical questions, such as those in the UNDP Quarterly reports, ask about the support for non-ethnic political arrangements, about the willingness to put the war behind and move forward towards building a new BiH society. These regular surveys indicate that most Bosnians are strongly dissatisfied with the state of the economy (an estimated unemployment rate of about 40%) and if they could do so, a majority would leave the country. Ethnic relations take a relative back-seat to the immediate economic worries of obtaining a daily livelihood. Such concerns are also seen in other multi-national post-Communist societies that have experienced conflict, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. Inter-ethnic relations must be examined within this context of economic insecurity; in a climate of scarcity, income disparities and bleak economic prospects, social relations can only be expected to improve when economic conditions ameliorate. within their ethnic group, or whether they mixed) and probing whether they want to have more friends from other ethnicities, we can evaluate the potential for breaking down the ethnic divisions in BiH that are frequently held to be the main obstacle to political and economic development. Friends and friendships in this article are operationalized from the perspective of the respondent. -a friend is who the respondent says he or she is. What might be a friend for one respondent might not rise to this level for another. It is difficult to define a priori a threshold of friendship since it is so highly variable from individual to individual, to distinguishing between, say, an "acquaintance" and a "friend" through the resilience and depth of bonds. I am not arguing that reducing ethnic isolation through friendships will redress all of BiH's problems but as will be shown below, there is both good and bad news in this report -Bosnians maintain a fairly high level of inter-ethnic interaction, especially in cities, and generally want more of this kind of social networking. But the barriers to interaction are steep and the levels of distrust and suspicion that hangs over from the war show little signs of waning. (The overall summary statistics are reported in the Appendix).
Social Interactions in Conflict Zones
Within the sizeable literature on social networks, a specialized sub-field has developed over the past decade or so on the subject of cross-ethnic friendships in potential, current and former conflict zones. Because the study of social interactions is dominated by sociologists and social psychologists and that of nationalism by political scientists and historians, the possibilities for a fruitful merger of the related topics are substantial. The states of former Yugoslavia, in particular, have been the sites of valuable work that has explored both the specificities of the causes of the break-up of this state after 1989 and the implications of this experience for other multi-ethnic societies. It is on this literature that I rely for the guiding hypotheses that are analyzed in this paper on postwar social interactions.
Most of the research on Yugoslavia and its successor states is ethnic-based, that is, the researchers who analyze its breakup, its wars, and its aftermath adopt a (rarely-debated) framework that accepts that ethnic fractures are historic, reinforced by conflict, and will remain for the foreseeable future. While some researchers (Campbell, 1998; Todorova, 1997 , Todorova, 2004 ) take the position that ethnic lines in former Yugoslavia are not unalterable and are manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for their own ends, most researchers accept that the ethnic (or national) categories are meaningful and spend little time trying to probe how they are formed or how they might be changed. What is clear is that the numbers of respondents in public opinion surveys who chose not to classify themselves in an ethnic fashion is low (in our survey, only 1.5% did not pick Bosniak, Serb or Croat). Even before the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the last pre-war census of 1989, only a small minority did not indicate Croat, Serb or Bosniak (Muslim) in what became the independent state of BiH (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994) .
Critics like Brubaker (2002) claim that offering the choice of ethnic labels presupposes their meaningful existence and in effect, offers respondents little option. In his essay on "groupism" (" the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis" -Brubaker, 2002, 164) , he criticizes the "coding bias" that assigns to ethnic and national categories meaningful explanations and that tends to ignore other elements of identity. Though individuals often hold multiple identities (often call the "matrioshka" or layered-identity model -Herb & Kaplan, 1999) , they still use categorizations that Brubaker and other critics (e.g. Tishkov, 1999 for the former Soviet Union) of "groupism" find unsatisfactorily limiting. In the question in the survey that asked about the respondent's primary identity, 53% said BiH citizen and 33% member of their ethnic group (8% picked "European"). But significantly, 71% of Bosniaks chose BiH citizen but only 15% of Serbs and 14% of Croats did. In postwar BiH, civic identity is strongly aligned with ethnicity.
"Bosnian citizens now find themselves in a political environment in which each person is identified by his or her ethnic group" (Belloni, 2001, 169) . The quarterly reports of the UNDP have consistently shown major differences in attachments between the three major ethnic traditions, Bosniak (Muslim), Serb and Croat. A recent report discusses the relationship between civic and ethnic identity -"for the Bosniak ethnic group these two values are in harmony. The other two groups are much more connected to their ethnicity, while looking at the State as something foreign to them. Taken together, attachment to own ethnicity, attachment to BiH, and social distance allow one to conclude two things. One is that ethnicity is the dominant determining factor in establishing social relations, i.e. that it is the most important social group for individuals in BiH. Not unrelated, one may conclude that in the field of individual identity, ethnicity is dominant over other forms of identity in BiH." (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2006). To account for these effects, my analysis includes identity as Croat and Serb (Bosniaks is the comparison group), and whether the respondent picked the civic option (citizen of BiH) as their primary identity. The variable definitions and their summary measures are presented also in Appendix 1. Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 2006) note that the conflicts in former Yugoslavia have produced a heightened sense of ethnic awareness and attachment that was waning in Tito's later years. Tolerance, understood as a reduction in cross-ethnic stereotyping and associated blaming, is a hallmark of an ebbing of traditional and primordialist attachments and was promoted heavily as a matter of state policy by the Communist regimes in the multi-national states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Kunovich & Hodson, 2002) . How does tolerance develop? How is tolerance measured in a practical way? Friendship across ethnic lines is a measurable and useful indicator of tolerance in a society; the depth and extent of friendships can be compared to preferences and beliefs about their value by different sub-populations.
Earlier work on tolerance across ethnic divisions in Croatia and in the former Yugoslavia by Hodson, Sekulić and Massey has shown substantial relationships with key predictors that measure elements of modernization and ethnic competition Since neither of these models is fully able to account for the variations in tolerance, recourse to both is necessary to make sense of the complex picture.
The modernization thesis is well-known in social science as a general mode of explanation for societal change over generations. With specific reference to ethnic tolerance, the modernization thesis predicts greater tolerance by urban residents, by younger people, persons living in ethnically-diverse republics and regions, and in those born of mixed ethnic parentage.
As people migrated from rural areas and traditional homelands, where their group is relatively isolated and has little contact with other groups, their destinations are typically metropolitan, more industrialized communities, either within their state or abroad. "Modernization theory treats ethnic identification as premodern, provincial, traditional, and particularistic. According to this theory, ethnic identification's structural basis is the village; its structural support is the persistence of a cultural, political and economic way of life" (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994 , 1536 . Migrants are exposed to more diversity in national, economic and social terms. The modernization thesis proceeds in a predictable manner -industrialization leads to city growth and brings in migrants from all sorts of villages, typically rural and homogenous. As the migrants flock to the cities, they live cheek-by-jowl and in neighborhoods/communities that are more ethnically mixed.
Ethnic boundaries are not as easily maintained in the urban environment and interactions in shared spaces such as schools also help to erode ethnic lines. Thus, cross-ethnic trust develops and tolerance results from the mixing. Educational levels will also typically rise over time and as people become more educated, they become more tolerant. In urban areas with fewer identity markers, people will likely also become less religious and young people especially will be more tolerant and will have more diverse friendship networks. Schools in multi-ethnic states are also more likely to promote ethnic tolerance in the curriculum. Minorities and majorities in mixed communities tend to reach out to each other in settings where they can engage in specific reciprocity, in which trust in others in based on personal experience and immediate exchange, especially in urban workplaces (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994; Pickering, 2003 Pickering, , 2006 . Younger people, born in the urban environment, are also expected to adopt the norms of tolerance more readily than their more traditional rural parents. General levels of trust are also higher among the educated, young and urban populations (Secor & O'Loughlin, 2005) .
Migrants who adhere to traditional beliefs and practices, especially in the religious domain, as well as residents of rural communities, are expected to reject modernization. The example of a survey of the former Yugoslavia before the wars began in 1991 generally supports these expectations, though the age variable was the reverse of the expected direction since older people were more tolerant (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994) . In his account of one family's experience, Sudetic (1998) shows how ethnic relations in Yugoslavia forcefully contradicts the myth that ancient ethnic hatreds between Muslims and Serbs led inevitably to the 1992-1995 war, a theme continued in Kaufman's (2001) book. Similarly, in her account of small-town prewar Bosnia, Jones (2005) describes how the ordinary world of children was torn apart by conflict in 1992 Oberschall (2000, 988) uses the concept of latent nationalism at a grass-roots level and shows how it was successfully activated by the ethnic manipulation of political elites leaders. He quotes Yugoslav polls from mid-1990 that found that only 7% believed that the country would break up into separate states, and 62% reported that the 'Yugoslav' affiliation was very or quite important to them.
In my study of post-war friendships in BiH, there are numerous measures of the modernization hypothesis. Key predictors of friendships across nationality lines and preferences for mixed-nation friendships include education (high school and above versus less than high school), age, gender (males are generally expected to interact more with the broader society in the workplaces and public spaces and as a result, to be more tolerant), from people who have general trust in others, from people from mixed ethnic parentage, the level of optimism about the economic prospects of the region in which the respondent resides, and a measure of daily interaction with people of different nationalities. The exact definition of the measure and the summary statistics of each are presented in Appendix 1.
The second and somewhat contradictory hypothesis regarding ethnic tolerance and friendships relates to the level of ethnic competition. As diverse groups share spaces, they come into more direct competition for resources. This competition plays out in workplaces, in neighborhoods, and in local politics. If the economy weakens or there is major economic structural change, such as de-industrialization, then there will be increased competition along ethnic lines. In other settings where resources are based on territorial control, such increased ethnic competition is expected to result in further exclusion of minorities from majoritycontrolled lands. This model has often been used to explain ethnic conflicts and especially, the role of ethnic elites and entrepreneurs in encouraging ethnic divisions for purposes of internal cohesion and increased group attachment is well-documented and frequently condemned (Campbell, 1999; Gagnon, 2004; Kostovicova, 2004; Ragin, 1979; Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 2006; Simonsen, 2005; and Sudetic, 1998) . In the case of the former Yugoslavia before the wars of the 1990s, ethnic tolerance was found to be negatively related to religiosity and to ethnic group identification and attachment. Further evidence for the value of the ethnic competition model is that those with a higher standard of living and therefore, less likely to fear economic competition from other ethnicities, have a higher level of tolerance; conversely, the unemployed and workers in industrial and construction jobs are less tolerant. Noteworthy is the finding that majority groups are less tolerant than minorities in the same places, further support for Pickering's (2003 Pickering's ( , 2006 conclusions that minorities find themselves in positions of adaptation that require a high level of coping skills, especially after majority-minority conflicts.
An extension of the ethnic competition thesis is the "ethnic resurgence" hypothesis examined by Kunovich and Hodson. In their study of religiosity and tolerance in Croatia in 1996, they find that religiosity's effects on tolerance is largely spurious and instead, they prefer a "religious salience" explanation that asserts that religiosity is merely a carrier of group identity and that its effects on tolerance is a function of the state of ingroup-outgroup (majorityminority) relations (Kunovich & Hodson, 1999) . By using control variables, it is possible to check further if the religiosity variable is merely an artifact of other explanations or if its joint and independent character remains significant. In this study of post-war outcomes in BiH, the rate of cross-ethnic friendships and the preference for multi-ethnic friendship networks is expected to correlate positively with the level of attachment to the ethnic group with which the respondent identifies, to the sense of pride in the ethnic group, to the level of intra-group trust (trust only members of the same group), to the level of religiosity, and to memberships in ethnic-based organizations.
The third major set of explanations of friendships is predicated on experiences of the violent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Recent work by Sekulić, Hodson and Massey has revisited the social-psychological explanation of violence and especially, the role of ethnic identity and attachment in contributing to conflict. Based on attitudinal surveys of the countries of former Yugoslavia between 1985 (before the wars) and 2003, they conclude that the specific events of the war itself and, especially, elite manipulation of public images of these events promote rising intolerance during and after the war. Importantly for our study, the psychological residual effects after the war have been slow to dissipate (Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 2006) . Similar conclusions have been reached in other specific studies for BiH by Bozic, 2006; Butollo, 2002; Dani, 1999; Irwin, 2005; Powell & Durakovic-Belko, 2002; Simonsen, 2005; Zvicdic & Butolo, 2001 .
The "blame game" has proven as enduring in BiH as in Northern Ireland, with each side castigating the others for causing the war and hindering the peace process by undermining the Dayton accords (Irwin, 2005 ; see also Toal, O'Loughlin, & Djipa, 2006) . Though the international community has tried to build "social capital" to reduce the ethnic attachments and cohesions, the effort has failed to live up to its promise (Fagan, 2005; Hakånsson & Sjöholm, 2007;  in generating them. The specific wording of the questions and the summary statistics for these war experience variables are also included in Appendix 1.
The final set of explanations to understand post-conflict friendships connects to the geography of conflict experiences and local contexts. Work by geographers in post-war BiH has emphasized the localized nature of the war and the context-specific post-war developments in the level of returnees after ethnic cleansing (Dahlmann & O Tuathail, 2005 , Ó Tuathail & Dahlman, 2006 Toal & Dahlman, 2006; Ó Tuathail and O'Loughlin, 2009 ) and on landscape symbolization and meanings as the various ethnic groups memorialize and mark the new ethnic lines that were enshrined by the Dayton Accords (Jeffrey, 2006; Kostovicova, 2004; Robinson & Probric, 2006) . By mapping the responses to the questions about the present and hoped-for levels of inter-ethnic friendships for the 35 sample communities, a clear idea emerges of the variation across the BiH contexts and evident trends such as fewer friendship networks in areas near the frontlines during the war (places that saw the most protracted violence and greatest amount of population displacements). The maps in Figures 1 and 2 display these patterns.
In this literature review, I stressed the multiple sets of influences that might determine the level of friendships across ethnic lines, suggesting a multivariate model, with numerous controls. However, in the context of the wider pre-war experiences, it should be remembered that Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994 , 1547 found that Bosnia-Herzegovina had the highest tolerance score of the eight regions/republics of former Yugoslavia that they studied in the late 1980s, a fact partly attributed to the diversity of the republic's population.
Survey Data: Methodology and Summary Statistics
In December 2005, across Bosnia-Herzegovina, a door-step face-to-face survey of over 100 questions by interviewers of the same ethnicity took 45 minutes on average to complete and the response rate of those contacted was 85.9%. After a pretest of 50 residents in Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, a total of 2000 adults completed the survey and the margin of error is +/-2.5%.
The overall survey is representative of the distribution of the population across the usual sociodemographic categories, as well as urban-rural, ethnic, and political divisions.
Since the survey cannot include all the 109 opštini of BiH with a large enough sample, the choice of study sites was based on a requirement of enough respondents in each sample community and also a correct sampling for study of differences in the sizes of nationalities.
(Details on the sampling design are included in Ward, O'Loughlin, Bakke, & Cao, 2006) . The data collection involved 3 stages: (1) collection for the opštini of BiH of aggregate thematic data (census data from 1991, updated with migration, returnee and population estimates using electoral data), with special attention to the population and ethnic data; (2) stratification of the sub-areas of the study sites for selection as survey sites; and (3) survey of populations using a random procedure. Systematic stratification on the basis of geographical units -in this case, districts ( opštini) --allows for a thorough investigation of the expectations about ethnic territoriality that emerge from the literature. Opštini were clustered in terms of the sociodemographic indicators. For each of the clusters, districts were sampled randomly, making possible the analysis of postwar conditions, national attitudes and ethnic interactions through the use of explanatory social-demographic variables to determine if contextual and (personal) compositional factors are significant.
The focus of this paper is an analysis of two questions. The first one asks about current closest friends "Who are your closest friends? Are they all from your nationality, mostly from your nationality, mixed nationalities, mostly from other nationalities, or are they all from other nationalities." Possible responses also included "don't know" and "refuse to answer." The responses indicate that over half of the residents of BiH (54%) have all or most of their friends from their nationality; the variation across the three main groups shows that at 43%, the Croat sample has about 10% fewer friends from mixed ethnicities than the comparable figures for Serbs and Bosniaks. This difference does not appear to be related to preferences for in-group friendships since the Croat ratio for preferences of friends from mixed ethnicities (strongly agree or agree) is more than 15% higher than the Bosniaks and a further 5% higher than the expressed preferences of Serbs.
The mix of friends can be affected by both preferences (in-and out-group) and opportunity; if respondents tend to live in mono-ethnic communities, such opportunities will be limited. The responses to the question about how often the respondent meets members of other ethnicities is dramatic; only 18% of Croats report meeting other ethnicities on a daily basis, with Serbs 29% and 53% of Bosniaks reporting the corresponding figure. Most of the Bosniaks in the sample live in urban areas whilst the majority of Croats and Serbs live in smaller, more homogenous communities or rural areas. Of course, the ethnic cleansing and migration during and after the war reduced significantly the number of mixed opštini in Bosnia-Herzegovina; by our calculation, only one opština does not have an ethnic majority in 2000, compared to 26 in 1991. While social distance is not always directly correlated with spatial distance (spatial isolation), research in a variety of environments shows that groups that are more segregated or more spatially concentrated are less likely to have contacts across group lines (Bakke et al, 2009 ). This relationship does not appear to hold for the Croat sample in BiH since 62% of that sample said that they meet other ethnic groups daily (the same ratio as Bosniaks). By contrast, Serbs, living the territory that saw the greatest amount of ethnic cleansing (Republika Srpska), report that only 42% of them meet other groups daily.
Other summary statistics in the Appendix indicate that the sample has a median age of 54, with slightly more women than men (expected given the gender-age differences), and has, on average, a high school education. Large proportions of each ethnicity are very proud of their group and most do not report a significant change in their in-group attachment over the past 15 years. Religiosity is quite dispersed across the categories; about 61% attend a place of worship several times a year or more. A dramatic figure for self-reports of witnessing violence with 27.3% of the respondents indicates that the respondent or a close family member saw an act of violence that resulted in injury or death in the 1992-1995 period. Just over half of the respondents were forced to move due to the conflict. The low ratio of mixed ethnic parentage at 6.5% also dramatically illustrates the strength of the ethnic social and religious divides in prewar BiH. This low ratio matches the estimate of Botev (1994) but is much lower than the estimated 40% of urban Bosnians estimated by Donia and Fine (1994) .
Because both dependent variables are scaled ordinally from strongly agree to strongly disagree for the friends' preference question and from "all from my nationality" to "all from other nationalities" for question on current friends, the appropriate statistical method is ordered probit analysis. Since the coefficients of the ordered probit model lack the ease of interpretation of the ordinary least squares regression, to make the results more accessible and understandable, I report both the coefficients and the associated probabilities generated using the Clarify procedure of King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000 ; see also Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2001 . The Clarify procedure converts the usual statistical output into quantities of interest, such as the probabilities of different socio-demographic groups choosing a survey response.
Understanding Cross-ethnic Friendships
The range of responses (on a 1-5 scale) between the 35 sample points across BiH ranges from 1.56 (between "all from my nationality" and "mostly from my nationality") to 3.67 ("mostly from other nationalities"). The distribution of the mean responses in Figure 1 War experiences are expected to be influential in determining the level of mixed national friendships. However, of the four measures of war experiences, three are not significant.
(These three predictors -those who say that they are not able to forgive members of other groups for their activities in the war, those who witnessed violent events, and those who said that they were more adversely affected by the war than by their neighbors -are retained as controls in the model). Only those who suffered from the war by being forced to move have, as expected, significantly fewer friends of different nationalities. Whether this is due to movement into mono-ethnic areas as a result of ethnic cleansing or because of the ethnic-psychological gap induced by the forced migration experience is not immediately evident in the study.
To see how the key predictive variable coefficients translate into response probabilities, the baseline predictive ratios from the final model in the top line of the table can be compared to the actual ratios reported by the survey in the appendix ( Table 2 ). The model estimates that, when all variables are set to their mean values, 16.8% have all friends from the same nationality (compared to 18.4% from the survey), 39.5% mostly from the same nationality (compared to 34.5% from the survey), and 42.9% have mixed friendships (compared to 44.1%). (Note that part of the differences can be accounted for the small number of "don't knows" and "refuse to answer").
A small sample of the probability comparisons illustrates the value of their presentation in Table 2 . Croats have a 7% lower probability of having all their friends from the Croatian ethnic group than other (non-Croat) ethnic groups, when all other variables are set at their mean values. More nuanced probability comparisons can be seen for the scaled variables such as trust in own nationality, in-group attachment or religiosity. Those who say that they have a stronger in-group attachment since 1991 have a 24% lower probability of a network of mixed ethnic friendships than those whose in-group attachment has grown weaker. A clear illustration of the diversity of friendship networks can be seen by taking some stereotypical estimates from the predictive relationships. Setting other variables at their mean values, if we take a 20 year old wealthy, female Bosniak, who does not consider herself a
Bosnian citizen, who does not meets other nationalities daily, who was not forced to move in the war, whose attachment to Bosniak ethnic group is high, whose trust of people is generally high and whose in-group trust is high, and who has a pessimistic outlook on the future of the country, her chances of friends coming from "mixed or other nationalities" is 16.0%.
Conversely, if we take a 80 year old poor male Croat who considers himself a Bosnian citizen, who meets other nationalities daily, who was forced to move in the war, whose attachment to his ethnic group is low, whose general trust is generally low and whose in-group trust is high, and who has an optimistic outlook on the future of the country, his chances of friends coming from "mixed or other nationalities" is 97.7%.
This analysis, then, has offered support for both the modernization and the ethnic competition hypotheses. However, the evidence for the effects of war experiences is a lot less, with only those respondents who were forced to move showing a clear relationship with the friendship patterns. Calculating probabilities for the model clearly illustrates the great deviations amongst the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in their friendship networks based on ethnic attachments, residence in mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic communities, and social status.
Modeling Preferences for Friendships across Ethnic Lines
The effects of modernization, ethnic competition and war experiences on the preferences for ethnic friendships are expected to be consistent with the effects on mixed friendship networks.
Modernization is expected to promote a wish to develop ethnic friendships, and conversely, ethnic competition to retard friendships while traumatic war experiences are expected to reduce such preferences. Compared to the model for existing friendship networks reported above, fewer significant variables entered the equation. Examination of other possible significant measures that relate to the three central hypotheses did not yield additional significance.
Further, interactive terms such as the multiplicative effects of ethnicity and religiosity, or ethnicity and mixed community did not show F-ratios that suggested that these terms would add to the explanation.
The geographic distribution of the preferences for friends from different nationalities shows a larger range than current friendships across the 35 sampling opštini of BiH. There is less geographic patterning or association with the entity lines than for the previous map. High and low values are widely and randomly distributed but there seems to be an association with the size of the sample, in turn proportional to the size of the community. Persons in small communities have lower preferences for mixed-ethnic friendships all across BiH regardless of ethnic composition. Since smaller communities are more likely to be more mono-ethnic, such preferences could also, to some effect, reflect the lack of opportunities for friends from different nationalities.
Overall, the support for the modernization thesis is stronger for the friendship preferences than it is for the current state of ethnic friendships. All five predictor variables for modernization reach a level of significance of at least 0.07, and all coefficients are in the hypothesized direction. Younger people more strongly support the notion of friends from different nationalities. Males also have a greater preference for mixed nationalities as friends, an outcome consistent with the more extensive social networks that males typically have.
Educated respondents (more than a high school education) also show a preference for mixed nationalities as friends. Persons with a high level of general trust (more typical of urban residents) also prefer mixed nationality friendships more than those who are suspicious.
Finally, as a reflection of urban diversity and size, respondents who reported that they encounter other nationalities on a daily basis have a higher preference for friends of different nationalities.
In contrast with the modernization thesis, the evidence for the ethnic competition explanation is more mixed. Of the nine measures associated with the ethnic competition hypothesis, four of them are not significant (though they remain in the model as controls). Serb identity, ethnic pride, membership of an ethnic organization, and respondents of mixed parentage variables all fall short of the significance threshold. Of the five significant measures for the ethnic competition model, only one does not conform to the expected direction;
respondents with greater in-group attachment since 1991 have a greater preference for mixed nationalities as friends. Otherwise, Croats show a greater preference for mixed nationalities as friends, and in contrast, the more religious respondents have less preference for this mixture.
Richer respondents prefer friends from different nations and a civic identity as a BiH citizen (in contrast to the ethnic option) also points to a similar preference. Observations 917 pseudo R² = .063 log likelihood = -1220
Of the four war experience indicators in the analysis, two (respondents who said that they were more affected negatively by the war and those who said that they cannot forgive members of other groups for their actions) are not significant. Persons who were forced to move have a significantly lower preference for friends of different nationalities and those who (or whose family members) witnessed violent events also line up in a similar manner. Some negative war experiences thus significantly reduce the motivation and interest to cross ethnic lines for friendships.
Probabilities for the baseline model with all variables set to their mean values show close correspondence to the ratios reported in the appendix (e.g. strongly agree .22 compared to .23, agree .27 compared to .24 and neither agree nor disagree .39 compared to .35). Large differences in the probabilities can be seen for each predictor such as the 15% difference Table 4 : Changing probabilities for significant predictors of friendship preferences on the question "I would like to have more friends of different nationalities in this region" from the model in Table 3 and Clarify procedure (Tomz et al 2001 Overall, the model for the preferences of ethnically-mixed friendships is more parsimonious and a better fit to the general hypotheses outlined earlier in this paper. In some ways, answers to this question are less constrained by circumstances than for the one about the current state of friendships which is highly affected by the nature of the community in which the respondent lives. Persons in mono-ethnic communities can more readily express a preference for more friends of different nationalities than might have friends from other groups, perhaps constrained by their residence in mono-ethnic communities. Bosnia-Herzegovina is now highly segregated and while the preferences showed that about half of the respondents want more friends from other groups, such choices may not always be accessible.
Conclusions
The results of this study can provoke both hope and concern. The optimistic note is sounded by the fact that almost half (47%) of Bosnian adults want more friends from different nationalities.
The differences in preferences between the ethnic groups are not dramatic. The pessimistic note is related to the fact that 41% of all respondents stated that all or most of their friends were from their own nationality. Analysis of the responses by geographic location and by explanations related to modernization, ethnic competition and war experiences indicated that all proved useful in understanding the distributions. Richer people, trusting persons, people optimistic about the economic future of their region, people who meet other ethnicities daily, males, older respondents, those with more education and those whose civic identity was of greater importance than their ethnic one all tended to have more friends from mixed nationalities and wanted to have more. By contrast, religious people, those more attached to their ethnic group over the past 15 years, those forced to move during or after the war, and those who trust only their own nationality had fewer friends from mixed nationalities and did not agree that they wanted more. The geographic distribution indicated the primacy of the urban-rural factor for both questions, and while respondents in the sample points in the Republika Srpska had fewer friends from the other nations (Bosniaks and Croats) than those in the Federation of Croats and Bosniaks, this regional difference is not apparent in the preferences for more friends for different nationalities and are determined by the higher levels of ethnic cleansing in the Republika Srpska.
The implications for friendship patterns across ethnic lines for reconciliation after conflicts are significant. As phrased by Licklider (1995, 681) 
Dependent variables:
Closest friends: "Who are your closest friends? Are they all from your nationality, mostly from your nationality, mixed nationalities, mostly from other nationalities, or are they all from other nationalities" Possible responses also included "don't know" and "refuse to answer." 
